Rethinking the Universal Structure of Criminal Law by Conde, Francisco Munoz
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 39 
Issue 4 Twenty-Five Years of George P. 
Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal Law 
Summer 2004 
Rethinking the Universal Structure of Criminal Law 
Francisco Munoz Conde 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Francisco M. Conde, Rethinking the Universal Structure of Criminal Law, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 941 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss4/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
"RETHINKING" THE UNIVERSAL
STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW
Francisco Mufioz Conde*
I. BACKGROUND REMARKS
The common law system, applied in the countries formerly or still associated
with the British crown, is virtually unknown in the jurisprudential world of the
Continental or civil law. This is due, no doubt, to the particularities of the
common law system and the distinguishing features of the continental European
legal culture, and also to the common law method of thinking. The particularities
of civil law derived, in the nineteenth century, from adoption of the Code
Napoleon and, in the twentieth, from the influence of the German doctrinal
system-an abstract set of categories that lends itself to application to any system
of criminal law regardless of its legislative foundations. Nonetheless, the system of
the common law has exercised much influence in other continental European legal
cultures that are likewise based on different premises and methods.
There is no doubt that knowledge of the common law system is progressively
becoming more important. The influence of this system-particularly as
developed in the United States-is felt widely in the fields of procedure as well as
commercial and constitutional law. The same influence will eventually reach the
field of criminal law. Yet it is obvious that the common law is a system that is
little inclined to theoretical speculation. Its primary focus is on the solution of
particular cases (case law). But rather than seeing this attribute as a defect, we
should consider it, for certain purposes, as an advantage. Once decided, the cases
live on in the thinking and in the opinions of judges, thus establishing themselves
as "precedents." A system of this sort is not likely to be formulated in abstract
principles; but paradoxically, it has enormous influence on judicial thinking and on
students who learn the law by studying these precedents.
At the same time, the common law should become more amenable to the
structural theories and conceptual categories of Continental thinking-at least so
far as these are more refined and sophisticated than the concepts used in the
common law. A minimum of systematic elaboration is necessary in any modern
legal system in order to reduce the complexity and facilitate its mastery. This task
could be rendered possible only by identifying basic concepts of criminal law that
* Professor of Criminal Law, University Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain.
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would enable the development of a universally applicable system of thinking. The
merit of the doctrinal system developed in Germany and applied in other
countries is that it in fact exhibits a set of categories that might apply in any legal
system.
The question of immediate practical importance is to what extent must
universal categories and principles accommodate the local details of legislation
and case law. The answer to this question must be contextualized in our present
situation-one which emphasizes internationalization and globalization of legal
thinking. One way to proceed is to develop a structure of basic distinctions and
concepts that would accommodate the tensions felt in all democratic legal systems.
A tentative list of these distinctions would include those between substantive law
and procedural norms, between acts and omissions, between caused and fortuitous
events, between act and actor, between justification and excuse, between attempts
and consummated offenses, and between perpetration and complicity. These
distinctions represent a set of polar contrasts. Attraction and repulsion between
these poles is arguably common to all legal systems that engage in debate about
the basic questions of criminal responsibility.
Another way to proceed would be to take the basic international treaties on
human rights as the foundation of a set of recognized universal principles. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the International Covenant of
Political and Civil Rights, and other more localized instruments such as the
European Convention of Human Rights could serve as the backdrop for the
refinement of principles binding and applicable on all states participating in the
international community. The task of correcting and conforming the
jurisprudence of individual states to international standards is well underway. For
example, in August 2000, the European Commission of Human Rights accepted
the complaint of a Spanish citizen convicted of an attempted felony on the ground
that he was convicted under an appellate system that recognized only one stage of
appeal. He properly complained that, under the European Convention, he should
have had the right to hear his alleged offenses clarified and established at the first
level of appeal.
The problems associated with globalization of criminal activity has created
the necessity for unification and harmonization of diverse criminal laws-not only
in the fields of drug offenses and money laundering, but also in the more
traditional types of crimes against the values of life and property. Because
contemporary crime knows no borders, it is imperative that we develop an
interactive system of criminal law that transcends the narrow boundaries of
territorial jurisdiction.
A third plane of development is represented by the creation of the
International Criminal Court on the basis of the Rome Statute of July 1998. The
general principles of criminal liability recognized by this statute could eventually
become the universal standard of legislation influencing numerous countries
around the world in their efforts at law reform. As an aspect of this development,
we should note the complexities and tensions generated in the effort to prosecute
[Vol. 39:941
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Chilean General Augusto Pinochet for genocide. Genocide is also defined in the
ICC Statute, and that means now that in a similar case in the future, the failure of
the statute in a country where the crime occurred to prosecute would result in the
intervention of the International Court.
The internationalization of criminal law requires attention to the details of
legal discourse in the major legal language of the western world. For good or ill,
the relevant norms of all are always expressed in a particular language. The
diverse traditions of the world's legal cultures have generated a conceptual
apparatus that appears different in different languages. For example, in many
continental European languages, the common law term "recklessness" finds no
counterpart. Similarly, the Continental concept of "dolus eventualis" has no easy
translation in English. The German term "Zumutbarkeit" has generated
equivalent terms of art in Spanish ("exigibilidad") and Italian (essigibilitd), but
not in English.
The problems of language sometimes merge with misunderstandings
generated by differences of philosophical temperament. For example, the terms
might lend themselves to translation, but misunderstandings by scholars prevent
the harmonization of legal cultures. A good example is the pair of German terms
"Rechtfertigung" and "Entschuldigung," which map rather clearly onto the
English terms "justification" and "excuse." According to two British criminal law
scholars, "the neat conceptual frame may be useful as a model, but on close
inspection we find that its elements shade into one another in a way that
ultimately defies the analytical clarity to which doctrine aspires."1 Nonetheless,
George P. Fletcher and Albin Eser have emphasized the utility of this distinction
as a basis for a general theory of criminal law applicable, in principle, in all legal
cultures.2 A general theory is then not only possible, but desirable, and it would
represent the first step toward the proper internationalization of criminal law.
The challenge remains clear, and it is derived from the simple fact that the
world of criminal responsibility takes on entirely different contours if it is located
in the realm of the common law; in the German sphere of influence; in the French,
Italian, or Spanish/Portuguese systems; or in countries with more unusual
languages and cultures-e.g., Russia, China, Japan, or Korea. In view of all of
these differences, is it possible to find a common language, a shared terminology
that would facilitate shared principles of liability and a shared policy toward
fighting crime and respecting human rights?
II. FLETCHER'S RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW AS AN IMPORTANT STEP TO
"UNIVERSALISATION" OF THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL LAW
As an important step in this direction, I will seek to identify the basic
concepts that could be used to mediate the common law and the Continental way
1. Nicola Lacey & Celia Wells, Reconstructing Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives on Crime and
the Criminal Process 53 (2d ed., Butterworths 1998).
2. See generally Albin Eser & George P. Fletcher, Justification and Excuse: Comparative
Perspectives (Transnatl. Juris Publications 1987).
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of thinking in criminal law by commenting on George Fletcher's influential
Rethinking Criminal Law.3
It has been twenty-six years since the publication of Rethinking Criminal
Law. It is difficult to summarize in a few pages the main innovations and
characteristics, the virtues and defects, and the lights and shadows of this
worldwide-famous book. But for a general evaluation, such as this one, I would
like to highlight that which seems to reflect best its principal contributions and
compare them with the trends that dominate the present panorama of criminal
law, and consequently, a good part of the penal codes in almost all the countries
belonging to our area of legal culture.
For the past two centuries, western societies have regulated criminal law
through various penal codes that share the same fundamental ideas. At the start
of the twentieth century, German philosopher Georg Jellinek said that "if the
historical legacy of a people were to consist only of its Penal Code, this would be
enough to reveal the cultural, ethical and intellectual level of its people, in the
same way that a palaeontologist can reconstruct the structure of a prehistoric
animal starting with just one bone."4
Nevertheless, one (bad) consequence of codification is, as Fletcher says,
"that every country goes its own way. Every country has adopted its own
conception of punishable behavior, its own definitions of offenses, its own
principles for determining questions of self-defense, necessity, insanity,
negligence, and complicity. Criminal law has become state law, parochial law."5
There have been many causes for this "nationalization" of criminal law. But
there is already much greater unity among diverse systems of criminal justice than
we commonly realize. And related to that, I will try in the following pages to
identify and discuss some of the principal topics of Fletcher's Rethinking Criminal
Law that illustrate at the same time the "deep structure" of the structures
commonly called the General Part of all systems of criminal law.
III. THE CONCEPT OF WRONGDOING:
THE PUNISHMENT OF ATTEMPTS AND THE STRUCTURE
OF ATTEMPTS IN CASES OF IMPOSSIBILITY
The traditional approach to crime stresses the consequences more than the
actor's intention: death is worse than wounds, actual murder is worse than
attempted murder. In traditional criminal law, the theory of wrongdoing is
hinged, therefore, on harm suffered by the victim. But if the heart of attempt is in
fact the intention, not the harm, must an attempt be punished with less severity
than the completed crime? Of course, the crime of attempt falls short of
3. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
4. Georg Jellinek, Die Sozialethische Bedeutung von Rechi Unrecht und Strafe 45 (2d ed., 0. Haring
1908).
5. George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 3 (Oxford U. Press 1998) (available in Spanish
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completion, and harm does not happen. But many criminal law theorists believe
that the completion of an intended offense is merely a matter of chance and does
not properly belong to the heart of the concept of wrongdoing. The modern
theory of criminal law stresses the actor's intention and supports the view that the
attempt should be the primary offense, that is, the heart of the concept of
wrongdoing. 6 "[T]he crime of attempt is the flagship of modern [criminal law]",7
But shooting intending to effect the commission of homicide must be punished as
homicide itself?8
In my opinion, the relevance of the victim's suffering in the criminal law
poses a serious hurdle to this trend. The point of view of the common man on the
street is still that, for instance, actual homicide must be punished more severely
than attempted homicide. It is very important to understand, as well, the meaning
of harm when the consequences of crime are irreversible, such as death, arson,
mayhem, and the like, and the exemption from liability recognized in all the
modern codes for the voluntary abandonment of the criminal plan before the
harm occurs.9 The penal codes from the majority of all countries recognize this
possibility and confirm, in my opinion, the importance of harm for the completion
of the concept of wrongdoing in the modern criminal law. As Fletcher says: "We
cannot adequately explain why harm matters, but matter it does."1°
According to the definition of attempt, an objective basis is necessary to
justify its punishment. The heart of attempt is in fact the intention, but an attempt
is not only the intention. The endangering of legally-protected interests is the
minimal prerequisite for the intervention of criminal law.11 This shift is more
evident in cases where the actor intends to do harm but the action he or she
undertakes in fact poses no concrete threat. These are the so-called impossible or
inept attempts. In fact, seen ex post, all attempts are impossible, but under
impossible attempts people understand cases where ex ante, objectively seen, some
specific barrier prevents the completion of the offense: the gun is unloaded, the
pocket is empty, the powder is just talcum powder and not heroin, the
abortifacient is a harmless substance. In these objectively innocuous actions, the
actor wants to commit an act that would clearly be criminal if the facts were as he
6. See id. at 173.
7. George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial 70 (Free Press
1988).
8. This subjective point of view explains that punishment for attempt in section 23 of the
Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), the German Penal Code, does not necessarily imply mitigated punishment.
9. See Francisco Mufioz Conde, El desistimiento Voluntario de Consumar el Delito (Editorial
Bosch 1972); Francisco Muioz Conde, Theoretische Begriindung der Straflosigkeit Beim Ructrickt vom
Versuch, in Zeitschrift fir die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 756 (de Gruyter 1972); Francisco Mufioz
Conde, Der Misslungene Rucktritt vom Versuch, in Goltdammer's Arhiv 33 (R.V. Decker's Verlag
1973).
10. See Fletcher, supra n. 7, at 83.
11. This view dominates German and Spanish theory of Criminal law. See e.g. Francisco Mufioz
Conde & Mercedes Garcfa Arnn, Derecho Penal: Parte General 78 (5th ed., Tirant lo Blanch 2002);
Claus Roxin, Strafrecht 11 (3d ed., C.H. Beck 1997). But recently the concept of legally protected
interest ("Rechtsgut," "Bien juridico protegido") and its harm or endangering it as a prerequisite of the
intervention of criminal law have been criticized. See e.g. Gunther Jakobs, Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil:
Die Grundlagen und die Zurechnungslehre Lehrbuch 36 (2d ed., de Gruyter 1993).
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believed them to be. According to the subjective theory, the actor's perception of
the events should be considered as the only decisive element in punishing attempt.
That is a tendency in theory as well as in the courts and penal codes of many
countries of the west, such as the United States and Germany." The former
Spanish Penal Code admitted in Article 52(2) the general punishment of the so-
called "impossible crime" and punished expressly in Article 411 attempted
abortion in a non-pregnant woman (believing that she was pregnant).13 This
position permitted avoiding to prove the existence of pregnancy.
As a reaction to the excesses of this extremely subjective point of view that
consequently implies criminal responsibility in cases of superstitious or imaginary
attempts, Article 16(1) of the new Spanish Penal Code says that the actions of
attempt "objectively" must be able to achieve the result. 4 The meaning of this
expression "objectively" seems to exclude the punishment of all kinds of
impossible attempts. But the statutory standard of "objectively" does not mean
that only actions that according to scientific standards, seen ex post, are able to
achieve the result could be punished as attempt. The statutory standard is
objective in the sense that an attempt can only exist if the "ordinary reasonable
man in the defendant's situation" could have believed that the facts were as the
defendant believed them to be.'5 Only in this case can the conduct appear to be
dangerous and disturbing to the community as a whole. Only this objective theory
of wrongdoing in cases of attempt can limit the excesses of a subjective theory, in
which the lack of actual danger to anyone in the action and no manifestation of
danger to unnerve the community are irrelevant. Surely there are also difficulties
with the objective theory's attempt to find a proper solution in those
aforementioned cases-the gun is unloaded, the pocket is empty, the powder is
just powder. But the objective view is the only one that can adequately explain
why superstitious, imaginary, or unreal attempts should not be punished and why
attempts should generate, objectively, for a reasonable man in the defendant's
situation, a risk of harm, even if that harm, seen ex post, could not occur in the
particular case. As we will see later, this objective standard of the "ordinary
reasonable man" can also be applied to clarify the distinction between justification
and excuse in cases of mistakes about factual elements of justification (putative
justification).
IV. POSSESSION OFFENSES, CRIMES OF ENDANGERING, AND
MISTAKES ABOUT LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE DEFINITION:
THE TREND TOWARD FUNCTIONALIZATION
The principle that criminal attempt requires the objective endangering of
legally protected interests has become well established as a model for defining
12. See Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 177; Fletcher, supra n. 3, at 146-57.
13. To this regulation, see Francisco Mufioz Conde, Derecho Penal: Parte Especial (14th ed., Tirant lo
Blanch 2002).
14. See Mufioz Conde & Garcfa Arin, supra n. 11, at 427.
15. Id. at 436.
[Vol. 39:941
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other offenses that fall short of causing harm. As Fletcher says, "[p]ossession
offenses are a spin-off from the law of attempts, acquiring the tools of criminal
activity being a typical stage in the progression from the onset of a criminal plan to
its harmful realization.' ', 6 Sometimes the possession itself (e.g., of weapons) is
prohibited. But the most common form of such possession offenses is the
possession of other tools for some criminal purpose-from counterfeit plates and
computer programs to burglary tools and trafficking drugs. In all of those cases,
the crime is not the possession itself, but the possession with the typical subjective
requirement of a criminal use, for instance, trafficking or leading another person
to consume the prohibited drugs. This makes it very difficult for the defendant to
prove that it was not his or her intention.17 But the "major difficulty with the
offenses of possession is," as Fletcher says,
that they sweep too wide. They encompass cases where there is no potential social
harm. People can possess burglary tools without an intention to use them. Unlike
drugs and guns, burglary tools are not likely to be dangerous if they fall into the
wrong hands. For this reason, courts have responded very skeptically toward
statutory provisions that prohibit tools appearing to have primarily a criminal use.'
8
Nevertheless, the trend in the modern penal codes and legislation is the
frequent use of crimes of endangerment, especially in its version of "abstract
danger," and the broad protection that is granted to universal, collective, or
institutional legal rights. For example, in the rubric of Title XIII of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1995, the term "socioeconomic order" appears next to patrimony,
whose protection leads to crimes such as false advertising,' 9 the possession of any
tools "specifically designated" to facilitate the suppression or neutralization of any
20technical device that has been used to protect computer programs, or the non-
authorized use of a geographical indication as representative of the quality of a
product,21 which in no way is different from simple administrative infractions,
some of which are already contained in their respective sectorial laws. The same
,,2 ,21
occurs in "crimes against the ordering of territory, 22 "historical heritage,
"natural resources and the environment, 24 and "flora and fauna, 25 whose
autonomous configuration in Chapters I, II, III and IV of Title XVI gives rise to
some cases of abstract danger which exactly coincides with the administrative
infractions that also exist in the administrative laws that regulate these areas.26
16. Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 176.
17. See decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court in Muhoz Conde, supra n. 13, at 639.
18. Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 176.
19. C.P. art. 282.
20. C.P. art. 270.3.
21. C.P. art. 275.
22. C.P. art. 319.
23. C.P. art. 321.
24. C.P. art. 325.
25. C.P. art. 332.
26. See e.g. C.P. arts. 319, 333, 335.
2004]
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An ulterior consequence of this trend is a certain tendency toward
deformalization, that is to say, the weakening of the strict principle of legality of
crimes and punishments (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). That can be
observed in the frequent use of indeterminate concepts and of general clauses
which leave the decision of what should or should not be a crime in the hands of
the judge. For example, Article 607 of the Spanish Penal Code punishes with up
to two years in prison "the dissemination by any means of ideas or doctrines which
deny the acts typified as genocide in Art. 607.1," assuming that the judge agrees to
consider that certain historical events (for example, Nazi concentration camps)
but not others were really genocides, and, even if so, it will always remain within
the judge's powers to decide for what historical period the prohibition to
disseminate these ideas applies. The concept of "moral integrity" is also hardly
precise (Title VII: "Crimes against moral integrity"27 ), nor is the concept of "racist
motives" as it appears as an aggravating factor N°4 of Article 22, or the
configuration of the crime of "provocation... to hatred.., against groups or
associations" in Article 510.1. But where the most discretion is left to the judiciary
is in the determination of the "severity" of negligence in the cases in which this is
expressly declared to be punishable2 8 or of the "danger" in crimes against
collective safety. The latter is mentioned sometimes in the definition of the crime
with the addition of the qualifier "concrete" in relation to the life and physical
integrity of persons,29 but there isn't a good understanding concerning the nature
of this kind of criminal act related to other legally protected interests.
Up to a certain point it seems logical that the legislator, in times of rapid
social change or highly conflictive situations, would fall into the temptation of
granting the judiciary broad discretion, not only regarding the determination of
the legal consequences of crimes, but also the definition of the criminal act,
offering flexible decision making programs which violate the principle of the
division of powers which is at the basis of the principle of legality, running the risk
that afterwards, in practice, judges would assume roles of direction and regulation
of social life for which they are not legitimated constitutionally. And if this
appears serious, it is considerably more serious that administrative authorities, if
only indirectly, decide the criminal character of an act. Cases where the penal
code delegates the power to decide the criminal character-to administrative law
or to other dispositions which are hierarchically inferior to that of a penal
statute-have involved references with certain frequency to the so-called "penal
statute as carte blanche"3 ° which has never enjoyed much support from the best
27. C.P. art. 173.
28. See e.g. C.P. arts. 142, 146, 152, 158, 159.2, 220.5, 267, 301.3, 317, 324, 344, 347, 358, 367, 391, 447,
532, 601,621.
29. See e.g. C.P. arts. 348, 349, 350, 343, 351, 363.
30. It is difficult to translate into English the German expression "Blankettstrafgesetze" and the Spanish
"normas penales en blanco," which mean that the definition of a crime in a penal statute refers to a more
specific definition of the prohibited conduct in the dispositions and enactments of administrative authorities
which are hierarchically inferior to that of penal statute. See e.g. Mufioz Conde & Garcia Arin, supra n.
11, at 39, 114 (providing an example in Spanish criminal law); Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas
[Vol. 39:941
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penal theory. Criminal norms of this type can be found in crimes against public
safety by manipulating pharmacological or food substances.3 The norms can also
be found in some of the crimes against the public treasury, where in order to know
what acts constitute fraud of other European Community countries, it is necessary
to reference European Community Law.32 As a result of this, the elements of
possession offenses and endangering crimes contain references to mixed questions
of law and fact, and then the question arises whether a mistake about those
elements should be considered a mistake of fact or a mistake of law. Article 14 of
the new Spanish Penal Code distinguishes between (i) mistake about the fact
constitutive of the crime, and (ii) mistake about ihe wrongfulness of fact
constitutive of the crime.33  The first kind of mistake-reasonable or
unreasonable, avoidable or unavoidable-negates the required intent for the
offense, and if it is not subject to prosecution on the basis of negligence, it
categorically prevents conviction. The second kind of mistake (mistake of law)
only negates culpability if it is not avoidable (reasonable), but if it is avoidable
(unreasonable) it leads to conviction of the intentional offense with an obligatory
reduction of penalty.
Now, we have to determine when to apply each strategy. As Fletcher says,
"the search for a theory to map some mistakes onto one solution and some, onto
the other, is the primary concern ',34 of this regulation. This question is even more
important in countries where mistakes of law do not excuse or are irrelevant. If in
one of the aforementioned crimes of endangering (for instance, against the
environment) or in possession offenses (for instance, possession of a prohibited
gun or drug) the defendant believes, reasonably or unreasonably, that
administrative authorities permit the activity or possession, should that be
considered as a mistake about the elements of the definition (that includes such
legal aspects as well) or as a mistake about the wrongfulness of the act? The first
solution prevents conviction, regardless of whether the mistake is reasonable or
unreasonable, if the crime is subject to prosecution only for intentional
commission; the second outcome prevents conviction and negates culpability only
when the mistake is reasonable or unavoidable, and if it is avoidable or not
reasonable, the intentional offense will result in conviction with an obligatory
mitigated penalty.35 The question is whether phrases such as "without permission"
or "without authority of law" are necessary elements of the required intent. In my
opinion, the solution is linked to the general theory of crime as a sequence. If the
first step in the sequence that leads to a conviction is proof of the factual or legal
elements of the definition, mistakes about those elements must be considered as
Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil 111 (4th ed., Duncker & Humblot 1997)
(providing an example in German criminal law).
31. See C.P. arts. 325, 333, 334, 335, 336.
32. See C.P. arts. 306, 309.
33. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between "Tatbestands (or Tatumstande)-und
Verbotsirrtum" in sections 16 and 17 of the Strafgesetzbuch, the German Penal Code.
34. Fletcher, supra n. 3, at 690.
35. In the German penal code, this mitigation of penalty is only facultative. See §§ 17, 49 StGB.
2004]
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mistakes negating intent required for the offense, independent of its factual or
legal character.3 6 This kind of sequential reasoning has nothing to do with a
formalistic reading of statutes, but with the definition of the crime as an
expression of the strict principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege). I agree that
my opinion leads to a restriction of penal responsibility in these sectors of
criminality, but as Liiderssen says "the greater the complexity of statutory
definitions and regulations of crimes, the more indulgence should be applied at
the subjective level."37
As is logical, the sectors that are most affected by the trends are those most
representative of a criminal law that Hassemer defines as "modern. 3 8 Those
sectors are characterized by omnipresent intervention in the spheres where
scientific or technical progress, economic trade, or the possibility of great danger
to the environment, quality of life, and even to humanity itself, pose problems of
enormous complexity that cannot be satisfactorily resolved with the models of a
"classic" criminal law-an "old" criminal law that is tied to the technique of the
crime of injury and structured fundamentally on the protection of individual
legally-protected interests.
In any case, the trend towards the protection of institutional or universal
legal interests seems inevitable in modern criminal law, and in order to protect
these efficiently, one must refer to possession offenses, to crimes of endangering,
and to "penal statute as carte blanche." But this should never justify the loss of
identity of criminal law and its conversion to a "soft law" by making it achieve the
objectives that are more appropriate for administrative law and infringing one of
its basic tenets, the principle of minimal intervention.39  A prudent
decriminalization policy in these areas, which in the short run is less visible to
public opinion, and thus less lucrative politically, can be more effective in the long
run and, obviously, much less damaging to the rights of citizens than criminal law
intervention at all costs. The protection of legal interests, the fundamental task of
any legal order, does not necessarily imply protection by criminal law, but rather,
as Claus Roxin says, protection before reaching criminal law, because one cannot
forget that the concept of a legally-protected interest was originally conceived
more as a limit than as a legitimization of the intervention of criminal law.
40
Perhaps if this idea had been taken more into account when drafting the new
penal code, it would have been possible to avoid including in it acts that can be
36. Francisco Mufioz Conde, El Error en Derecho Penal 107 (Tirant lo Blanch 1989); see Winfried
Hassemer, In die Grundlagen des Strafrechts 188, 231 (Muinchen 1981) (discussing the sequential nature
of the general theory of crime and its implications).
37. Klaus Lderssen, Die Parteispendeproblematik im Steuerrecht und Steuerstrafrecht, Vorsatz und
Irrtum 230 (Wistra 1985); see Wolfgang Naucke, Uber Generalklauseln und Rechtsanwendung im
Strafrecht (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Tubingen 1973).
38. Winfried Hassemer, Produktverantowortung im Modernen Strafrecht 9 (C.F. Maller 1994);
Winfried Hassemer & Francisco Mufioz Conde, La Responsabilidad por el Producto en Derecho Penal
26 (Tirant lo Blanch 1995).
39. Regarding this principle, that stresses the character of Criminal law as "ultima ratio" instrument of
legal order, see Francisco Mufioz Conde, Introducci6n al Derecho Penal 59 (Bosch 1975).
40. Claus Roxin, Sinn und Grenzen der Staatlichen Strafe, in Roxin, Strafrechtliche
Grundlagenproblemen 14 (de Gruyter 1973).
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adequately prevented and sanctioned by other non-penal legal means. At the
same time it could allow the criminal law to serve as a pretext or as a "screen" to
remedy the defects in regulation or functioning of other legal institutions.
In sum, one can deduce that the new Spanish Penal Code, as it concerns the
protection of collective or universal interests, has a more penalizing than
depenalizing aim that, at least in this area, conceives criminal law more as a
political instrument of social direction than as a mechanism of legal protection
subsidiary to other branches of the legal order. That is, without a doubt, a
consequence of the trend towards functionalization. It is not only a consequence
of systemic functionalism and the "orientation towards consequences, 41 that is so
influential nowadays in the theory of criminal law4' and the social sciences in
general, but also of the inevitable instrumentalization of criminal law by a criminal
justice policy that does not conceive itself anymore, as von Liszt would have it,43 as
a mere directorate limited by the unbreakable barrier of criminal law, but as an
instrument of direction and social configuration that tries to resolve the most
crucial problems of the societies of our time with the prima facie and not purely
secondary help of criminal law. It is obvious that a criminal law that is
functionalized by criminal justice policy and general deterrence interests is easier
to justify by public opinion, and it is more viable politically than a minimal
criminal law that purely offers guarantees, conceived as the last ratio of the legal
order.44 But this vision of criminal law is dangerous in that tasks are assigned to it
that in practice it cannot accomplish, thus offering deceitfully to the public a
perspective on problem solving that later cannot be verified in reality.
V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
One more general question that illustrates Fletcher's concerns about
theoretical problems is the legal nature of exemptions from penal responsibility
and the distinction between justification and excuse. This distinction is not
particularly difficult to understand. Claims of justification concern the rightness of
an act that nominally violates the law-for instance, self-defense, necessity,
consent, use of force in law enforcement, and the so-called "indications" in cases
of legal abortion. No one is entitled to defend him or herself from a justified act,
and third parties are permitted to assist the justified actor. Excuses, such as
insanity, involuntary intoxication, duress, or mistake of law, imply that the actor is
not personally to blame for the untoward act.45
So far, so good. Some penal systems, notably the German and Spanish ones,
cultivate this distinction as basic elements in the structure of criminal acts, but
41. Hassemer, supra n. 38, at 22.
42. See Jakobs, supra n. 11.
43. See Franz v. Liszt, Strafrechtliche Aufsatze und Vortrage 80 (Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1970).
44. Cf Mufioz Conde & Garcfa Arin, supra n. 11, at 78.
45. See generally Eser & Fletcher, supra n. 2; Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 176; Fletcher, supra n. 3, at 799-
800; George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1985).
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then arises the question of how to solve cases of so-called putative justification,
that is, of mistakes about factual elements of justification. The new Spanish Penal
Code contains no legislated solution for the problem; the way we should treat
mistakes of this sort confounds both courts and theorists. Some systems, such as
the French and Anglo-American systems, which have shown little concern about
elaborating the distinction between justification and excuses and exploring its
implications, treat putative justification as a justification in itself; in this sense the
Model Penal Code has taken the position that putative self-defense should be
treated just like actual self-defense: if the actor believes that he or she is being
attacked or that the use of force is immediately necessary to repel the attack, then
46the use of force is justified. That is the traditional position of the Spanish
Supreme Court as well.47 The German courts and theorists support the position
that putative justification negates the required intent and by analogy apply the
rule for mistakes of fact 48 to mistakes about the factual elements of a justification.
Fletcher thinks the correct view in cases of putative justification is to treat it, if the
mistake is reasonable, as an excuse;41 in this way, the aggression of the putative
defender remains wrongful and it is possible as well the right to defend against one
who mistakenly believes, either reasonably or unreasonably, that she or he is a
victim of an aggression. But in my opinion, the standard of "a reasonable man in
the defendant's situation" belongs to the concept of wrongdoing, to solve
problems not only of impossible attempts, but also of putative justification. ° The
strategy of this argument is, as Kent Greenawalt says, to shift from whether the
invasion of the victim's interest was justified to whether the risk that the actor
took-regardless of the impact on the victim-was reasonable and therefore
justified."
This position does not mean that the only requirement for justification is the
good-faith subjective beliefs of the defendant, but that the subjective beliefs and
reactions of the defendant must be tested against the objective community
standard of reasonableness. This standard is then a "'two-pronged' or 'hybrid'
test., 52 In its first prong, the test requires that the defendant actually believe there
are the factual elements of justification (an aggression in case of self-defense, a
risk to life or physical integrity of the woman in case of legal abortion, the consent
of the woman in case of rape, legal authority to arrest and detain a suspect in case
of kidnapping). The second prong is that this belief must correspond to what a
reasonable person would believe under the circumstances. Only if the test passes
both prongs, the subjective and the objective standards, could the action be
46. See Eser & Fletcher, supra n. 2.
47. See Jescheck & Weigend, supra n. 30, at 466.
48. See § 16 StBG.
49. See Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 90-91.
50. See e.g. Francisco Mufioz Conde, Putativ Notwehr, in Coimbra-Symposium fir Claus Roxin 220
(Karl Heymanns K.G. 1995).
51. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897
(1984).
52. See Fletcher, supra n. 7, at 42.
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considered taken in putative justification as a justified action and putative
justification as a justification itself. The right of the victim to defend her or
himself, which Fletcher considers incompatible with this position,53 can be
admitted as both a case of necessity and a claim of justification, but also as another
sort of claim of justification that the claim of justification can invoke the putative
actor. When Fletcher says "[o]thers may be wrong, but their wrong path might
still be on the map of reasonable alternatives, '54 why not on the map of justified
alternatives too?
53. See generally Fletcher, supra n. 5, at 89-91.
54. Fletcher, supra n. 7, at 40.
20041
13
Conde: Rethinking the Universal Structure of Criminal Law
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003
954
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss4/12
